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Abstract 
Experimental archaeology is often understood both as testing hypotheses about processes 
shaping the archaeological record and as generating tacit knowledge. Considering lithic 
technologies, I examine the relationship between these conceptions. Experimental archaeology 
is usefully understood via ‘maker’s knowledge’: archaeological experiments generate embodied 
know-how enabling archaeological hypotheses to be grasped and challenged, further well-
positioning archaeologists to generate integrated interpretations. Finally, experimental 
archaeology involves ‘material speculation’: the constraints and affordances of archaeologists 
and their materials shape productive exploration of the capacities of objects and human skill in 
ways relevant to archaeological questions.  
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1. Introduction  
When philosophers discuss speculation, it is as a theoretical, imaginative, activity. The 
generation of ideas and hypotheses is implicitly removed from the material activities of 
experimentation and observation1.  
When archaeologists consider experimental archaeology, it is often in a hypothesis-testing 
mode: archaeologists perform experiments to probe ideas about how past processes shape the 
material record.  
I won’t deny the importance of archaeological experiments in validating theories of past 
processes, nor of theoretical speculation. I’ll highlight sins of omission. Speculation in 
experimental archaeology is intimately linked with the materiality of the archaeological record 
and proxies: it is speculation made material. Experimental archaeology provides epistemic goods 
beyond hypothesis-testing: it generates ‘maker’s knowledge’ which positions archaeologists to 
grasp, critique and integrate archaeological knowledge. 
I’ll provide an initial characterization of experimental archaeology, emphasizing hypothesis-
testing and linking archaeological theory with the material record. I’ll then introduce two worries 
my account of experimental archaeology will mitigate. First, Martin Bell (2014)’s Xeroxing: instead 
of reconstructing objects from the material record, archaeologists sometimes reconstruct 
previous archaeologists’ reconstructions. Second, an integrative challenge. Material analysis 
requires decontextualizing various excavated items. However, archaeological knowledge 
requires integrating considering sites of interest holistically. How, then, do archaeologists 
balance the benefits of isolated analysis with the need for integrated explanation? 
 
1 An exception being discussion of ‘exploratory experiments’ (e.g., Franklin 2005, Currie 2020).  
Exploratory experiments explore a particular phenomenon generated via experimental procedure, 
experimental archaeology is typically geared towards understanding past practices by re-enactment. Both 
are exploratory, but toward differing aims. 
3 
 
I respond by arguing that maker’s knowledge captures some of experimental archaeology’s 
epistemic features. ‘Maker’s knowledge’, a notion with deep roots in Early Modern philosophy, 
grants know-how a central place in epistemology: to understand something is to know how to 
construct it. I’ll provide a philosophical analysis of such knowledge, focusing on how making 
‘well-positions’ agents to gain knowledge. I’ll argue that maker’s knowledge illuminates 
experimental archaeology in two ways. First, experimental practice provides archaeologists with 
relevant know-how for understanding relevant experimental traditions, partially mitigating 
Xeroxing. Second, maker’s knowledge well-positions archaeologists to integrate previously-
decontextualized knowledge.  
Finally, I’ll consider experimental archaeology as a material mode of speculation. I’ll argue 
that sometimes successful speculation turns on local engagement with the material at hand; 
speculative practices can be intimately tied to material engagement. In experimental 
archaeology, speculation is not decoupled from building things, breaking things, and the close 
examination of material. Here, speculation is best understood as an embodied practice. 
A few caveats. Experimental archaeology is diverse. I’ll focus on lithic technology, particularly 
flintknapping. Despite this focus, I haven’t hastily generalized from cherry-picked examples. I 
don’t argue that all experimental archaeology, nor speculation, is best understood in terms of 
maker’s knowledge and materiality. Rather, experimental practices like flintknapping are well-
understood in these terms. Further, there are discussions within archaeology which I lack the 
space to engage with substantively: Ingold’s important work on materiality and improvisation 
(Ingold 2013), Renfrew and Malafouris’ enactivism (Renfrew 2004, Malafouris 2007, Iliopoulos 
2018), and tradition of chaîne opératoire (Dobres 1999, Audouze & Karlin 2017). My approach 
differs sufficiently to leave engagement for now. 
2. Experimental Archaeology 
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The term ‘experimental archaeology’ has various applications. Archaeologists reconstruct 
ancient buildings and recover ancient pottery, textile and tool-making techniques. Lithic tools 
construction, my focus, is a hobby, is for museum and pedagogical purposes; towards 
discovering how they were made, used, and to understand their traces. These practices’ history 
stretch to at least the 19th Century (Johnson 1978)2. In light of this diversity, we should narrow  
focus and lay groundwork. 
Recent discussion of experimental archaeology emphasize hypothesis-testing and its role in 
‘bridging’ archaeological theory and the material record. Regarding the former, I’ll characterize 
experimental archaeology as ‘trace-based reasoning’: the practice involves testing hypotheses 
which link the archaeological record with the past via historical processes. Regarding the latter, 
I’ll argue, we can make sense of experimental archaeology’s ‘bridging’ role by emphasizing how 
interaction with materials grounds archaeological interpretation. I’ll then isolate two challenges 
that my account will illuminate: ‘Xeroxing’ and ‘integrative interpretation’. 
2.1 Hypothesis-Testing 
Most archaeologists spend more time collating and analyzing materials than fieldwork. These 
processes are sophisticated and varied: the material record is categorized, organized, and put to 
multiple analyses: from comparative work to various chemical and physical studies. Although this 
involves experiment, it isn’t ‘experimental archaeology’. I’ll reserve that term for the practice of 
performing experiments towards understanding the processes which shape the material record.  
In this vein, Alan Outram emphasizes ‘actualism’: using similar materials to those used in the 
past to test hypotheses: 
 




… hypotheses can be tested with authentic materials and in a range of environmental 
conditions that aim to reflect more accurately ‘real life’ or ‘actualistic’ scenarios. Such 
experiments investigate activities that might have happened in the past using the 
methods and materials that would actually have been available. (Outram 2008, 2). 
Dana Millson has similar emphasis: 
Experimental Archaeology thus forms an essential step in archaeological endeavour 
whereby hypotheses and theories that have been made about the past can be tested to 
be confirmed or rejected. (Millson 2011, 4). 
So too does Jodi Reeves Flores: 
[experimental archaeology is] 1) the process of replicating past material culture, 
conditions, and/or processes in order to address a hypothesis, as well as 2) the use of 
products resulting from the replication of past material culture, conditions and/or 
processes. (Flores 2011, 41). 
So, we can understand experimental archaeology in terms of trace-based reasoning (Currie & 
Killin 2019). To infer from a material object (a trace) to the past, we need to understand how past 
processes shaped that object: hypotheses capturing regularities about how objects are 
deposited, how they degrade and transform over time, and how they relate to other objects 
(Raab & Goodyear 1984, Kosso 1991, Jeffares 2008, Currie 2018). Archaeologists identify 
dependencies between traces and the past. For instance, patterns of cut-marks on bones speak 
to how they were butchered. Inferring from cut-marks to butchering techniques requires 
hypotheses explaining how various butchering techniques generate distinctive cut-marks. 
So, to infer from a trace to the past, archaeologists need hypotheses about how historical 
processes shape the material record. As a first pass, we can understand experimental 
6 
 
archaeology as the business of testing hypotheses concerning such processes. Consider Kuhn’s 
seminal work on the morphology of lithic flint tools.  
Kuhn is interested in ‘resharpening’. 
One important aspect of the “use life” of a tool is the frequency of renewal or 
resharpening. The resharpening of tools is an economical tactic for producing sharp, 
usable edges while minimizing the cost of transporting multiple tools or bulky raw 
materials. (Kuhn 1990, 583). 
Kuhn’s index infers a tool’s ‘reduction’: how much it has been resharpened over its life. 
Approximately, the index is a relationship between the thickness of flaking scars and the 
thickness of the tool. Kuhn conducts experiments to argue that measurement data of flaking 
scars and thickness can be read as traces of past reduction: 
In order to ascertain the degree to which variation in flake form and measurement 
error affect the precision of the geometric index of reduction, 25 unifacial 
sidescrapers were progessively reduced and reduction indices calculated at each 
resharpening. In order to simulate a diverse archaeological assemblage, the sample 
included flakes which varied widely in form. (586) 
This is experimental archaeology as hypothesis testing. Kuhn wants to infer from a trace—
archaeological lithics—to reworking over the lithic’s life. This requires a hypothesis capturing 
dependencies between a lithic remains’ morphology and its past resharpening. The measurement 
index is that hypothesis quantified, and he validates it by constructing reasonable proxies of 
those lithics and exploring the relationship between resharpening and the flakes’ subsequent 
morphology.  
2.2 Experiment & Interpretation 
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So, we can understand experimental archaeology as trace-based reasoning; archaeologists 
conduct experiments to test hypotheses about how the archaeological record forms. Some 
archaeologists also claim that experimental procedures aid in mitigating the so-called 
‘subjectivity’ of archaeological interpretation. I’ll briefly defend this idea. 
Despite its long history, experimental archaeology is often linked to the development of 
‘new’ or ‘processualist’ archaeology in the 1960s (Binford 1962). Post-processualists argued that 
such approaches undervalue humanistic interpretation and hides various biases. Recently, 
defenders of experimental archaeology argue it bridges the apparent dichotomy between 
archaeology-as-science and archaeology-as-art/craft (see Shanks & McGuire 1996). As Millson 
puts it: 
Theory can then be reconsidered in light of this new information and a new foundation 
for further study created. So, although scientific in practice, Experimental Archaeology is 
strongly connected to theory and plays a bridging role between data and theory – 
between science and arts. (Millson 2011, 4). 
Or as Koerner puts it, “experimental archaeology might be highly relevant for fresh 
orientations towards apparently irresolvable clashes between the most influentially opposed so-
called ‘new’ and ‘post-processual’ theoretical paradigms” (2011, 2). 
Experimental archaeology is positioned as answering a perennial archaeological challenge: 
pernicious forms of subjectivity arising from the lack of constraint from the material record. I 
think we should take Koerner and Millson’s claims about experimental archaeology seriously. 
The standard answer to the problem of interpretation is a combination of multivocality and 
reflexivity (Hodder 1999). Both multiple evidence streams and multiple perspectives are brought 
together in interpretation; archaeologists continually reflect on how archaeological 
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preconceptions might shape and bias those interpretations (Gero 2007). Complementarily, Bob 
Chapman and Alison Wylie highlight the materiality of the archaeological record:  
[the archaeological record has] a striking capacity to function as a ‘network of resistances 
to theoretical appropriation’ that routinely destabilizes settled assumptions, redirects 
inquiry and expands interpretive horizons in directions no one had anticipated. (Chapman 
& Wylie 2016, 6) 
Despite the subjectivity of interpretation, archaeologists reasoning from material remains 
often pushes beyond preconceptions. How? Chapman & Wylie’s answer is two-pronged. First, 
evidential reasoning in archaeology is non-hierarchical, not relying on some bedrock of well-
established theory, but on complex patterns of scaffolding. Second, this scaffolding is in 
continual contact with an often intransigent material record. The objects archaeologists analyze 
will not bend to preconceptions anywhichway; the material record provides a rich empirical 
grounding for archaeological interpretation. 
So, archaeologists adopt a reflexive, pluralistic and integrative approach to interpretation. 
These strategies practically resolve theoretical debates amongst archaeologists3. Why think 
experimental archaeology plays a special role? Following Chapman & Wylie, insofar as 
experimental archaeology ties interpretation to the record, we can understand it as bridging free-
wheeling interpretation and the ‘network of resistance’ materiality affords. It forces 
archaeological interpretation to be linked to, tested and formed by, their engagement with 
materiality.  
For all that they may still be problematically reflected in archaeological attitudes and 
institutions, epistemically-speaking there’s reason to consider the dilemmas around the 
 
3 Partly: debates sometimes concern what kinds of questions archaeologists should ask and what the 
point of archaeological analysis is (Currie 2019a). 
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subjectivity of interpretation resolved. The intransigence of the material record, a diversity of 
evidence streams and perspectives, and continual reflection by archaeologists themselves, allow 
them to navigate the tension between too-conservative mere categorization and analysis of the 
material record, and too-ungrounded speculation (Wylie 1985). And in this, by tying 
archaeologists further to materiality, experimental archaeology is a crucial lynch-pin.  
2.3  Xeroxing and Integration 
I’ve provided an initial characterization of experimental archaeology as the practice of using 
proxies to probe hypotheses concerning processes linking the archaeological record to the past. 
These practices play into how archaeologists resolve problems from the subjectivity of 
interpretation. But not all epistemic ducks are in a row. I’ll highlight two epistemic worries that 
my account of experimental archaeology partly mitigates. The first comes from the experimental 
nature of archaeological practice. 
Experiments do not stand alone. They form experimental traditions: apparatus, experimental 
sequences, background knowledge, and best-practices become codified across labs, passed 
through pedagogical practices, established as standardized publication requirements, and so 
forth (e.g., Franklin 1989). Such traditions ensure repeatability, meaningful communication 
between scientists, and the exploration of experimental systems. However, archaeologists are 
well-aware of the contingency of past human societies and behaviors: across time and place, 
humans do things differently, sometimes dramatically so (Barrett 2016). While some 
archaeological knowledge may be quite general—how various materials degrade over time, 
say—others might be extremely local. There is a tension here: between the importance of 
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experimental traditions to archaeologists’ constructing knowledge, and the unique, contingent 
nature of archaeological targets4. 
Martin Bell captures this tension with ‘Xeroxing’ (2014). Xeroxing is concerned with 
experimental traditions, so is particularly pertinent to our focus. Bell targets open-air 
experimental archaeology, particularly the practice of constructing roundhouses, popularized in 
the UK by Peter Reynolds. 
Reynolds’s roundhouse constructs have been highly influential – in a way, rather too 
much so, because many examples made by others fall into the ‘xeroxing’ category, 
whereby one experiment reproduces rather than tests the results of another. (2014, 50) 
‘Xeroxing’ is the practice of recreating another’s experiment, rather than recreating features 
of the site of interest. This raises two related problems. The first concerns independence. We can 
understand an inference about a particular archaeological site as drawing on two kinds of theory: 
(1) a particular hypothesis about the site (say, that a roundhouse was built thus-and-so), and (2) 
hypotheses linking traces to past processes (say, that various topographical scoops are indicative 
of past round-houses). What Wylie calls ‘vertical independence’ concerns the relationship 
between the evidential bases of these two kinds of hypotheses (2011). If they overlap 
significantly, there is a danger of evidential circularity. The second problem concerns the 
generalizability of archaeological knowledge. If building practices (say) are to archeological 
targets, then focusing experiments on structures from single locales might miss and 
misapprehend that diversity. 
Xeroxing challenges any experimental tradition, but is particularly pressing in archaeology 
because of the diversity and peculiarity of human cultural practices and products. 
 
4 This kind of point has recently become a point of contention in ethnoarchaeology, see Gosselain 2016, 
Lyons & David 2019. 
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Against Xeroxing, Bell recommends that experimental archaeologists orient their efforts 
closely to the specifics of sites, rather than too-closely following pre-existing experimental 
practices: 
… there is still a tendency to interpret what we have found in terms of what others have 
found, rather than on the basis of detailed, empirically based work. Analogy drawn from 
ethnography and experiment is one of the ways in which our frame of reference and pool 
of ideas can be expanded. Experiments enable us to test interpretations and evaluate or 
limit the influence of pre-understandings. (2014, 55, also Bell 2009). 
Bell’s recommendation is not unfounded: by focusing their experimental efforts more 
towards the specifics of sites, idiosyncrasies may shine through. However, as we’ll see my 
account of experimental archaeology also provides grounds for a sunnier conception of 
Xeroxing. Let’s consider archaeological integration.  
Archaeological analysis involves decontextualization (‘fragmentation’, Jones 2002)5. In the 
field, archaeologists identify, categorize and extract objects which will become archaeological 
data. These processes require removing objects from original placement and ‘carving’ them from 
general deposition. This necessitates information-loss: extraction is destructive, and only some 
information about deposition and extraction can be recorded. In material analysis, particularly 
those involving chemical and physical properties, objects are considered in isolation, in terms of, 
say, rates of carbon-decay. But archaeological interpretation involves integration: sites are 
considered holistically from a range of perspectives and evidence-lines.  
How do archaeologists integrate fragmented, decontextualized evidence? We’ve seen part of 
the answer. As Bell says, “greater independence of preunderstandings is achieved where a range 
of specialists from different disciplines and backgrounds contribute to interpretative debate.” 
 
5 See Leonelli 2016 for more general discussion of de-contextualization. 
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(46). Fragmented evidence is an opportunity for multivocality in interpretation and consilience in 
evidence. However, more can be said about the epistemic nature of these interpretative debates. 
I’ll argue that conceiving of experimental archaeology via maker’s knowledge provides a richer 
answer: experimental archaeology creates know-how which positions archaeologists to 
productively engage in integrative interpretation. 
3. Maker’s Knowledge, Positioning & Embodiment 
We’ve identified two challenges for archaeological knowledge relevant to experimental 
archaeology:  Xeroxing (experimental traditions drawing on previous experiments rather than 
sites themselves) and integrative interpretation (reassembling decontextualized evidence). 
Understanding experimental archaeology in terms of ‘maker’s knowledge’ sheds light on both. 
I’ll discuss the concept generally before applying it to experimental archaeology. 
I’ve thus-far discussed experimental archaeology as hypothesis-testing, but another common 
theme is its generation of expert embodied skill. Consider these reflections by François Bordes’, 
at the time a famous skilled knapper and archaeologist: 
… no publication, no conference, no movie will ever replace the actual production, by the 
archaeologist himself, of the tools he is studying… [compared to skilled knappers] it was 
much more difficult to pass it on to the archaeologists who had never, or almost never, 
taken a hammerstone or an antler in their hands… I feel them more than I see them. 
(Johnson et al, 1978, 359) 
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Part of the aim of my analysis is to reconcile Bordes’ appeal to tacit, practical knowledge with 
the hypothesis-testing we saw in section 26. To begin, we’ll need an account of maker’s 
knowledge. 
3.1 Maker’s Knowledge 
‘Maker’s knowledge’ connects knowledge with constructing or bringing about the subject of 
knowledge. The notion is often discussed in the context of Early Modern debates about 
knowledge’s fundamental source (e.g., Gaukroger 1986, Pérez-Ramos 1988), tending toward 
sfoundationalist readings of maker’s knowledge, which I’ll avoid here (see O’Malley 2009). # 
We can consider the underlying idea of maker’s knowledge by comparing the epistemic 
standing of an agent who constructs or brings about, with that of an agent who has 
observational or testimonial knowledge. I’ll use Floridi’s recent discussion (2018) as a starting 
point, his account is useful for providing an approach to maker’s knowledge which avoids various 
epistemic rabbit-holes. 
Floridi considers maker’s knowledge via propositional information. For some proposition p, 
what is the difference between someone observing or being told p, and someone who has 
brought p about? For Floridi, the difference is not p’s content: in principle the same information 
can be had by observers and makers; p is p for either agent. Rather, the difference is in the 
‘account’ of their knowledge: their justification. Where for observers “we are talking of 
experience epistemically, in terms of perception” for the maker “we are talking about experience 
pragmatically, in terms of interaction” (2018, 478). For Floridi, the maker’s knowledge is not a 
posteriori, because the knowledge doesn’t turn on makers experiencing p, but on their bringing p 
 
6 An interesting set of analyses which parallel my own can be found in a collection edited by 
Cunningham, Heeb & Paardekooper (2007). There, they distinguish between experimental archaeology, 




about. That is, “marker’s knowledge is knowledge of a system from within, not from without” 
(Ibid, 479).  
For illustration, consider some knowledge related to lithic construction: “the presence of 
negative scars [are] a basic characteristic of core-like things” (Hiscock 2007a, 209). Cores are 
rocks from which flakes are scraped during reduction. Negative scars are the remains of removed 
flakes7. On Floridi’s analysis of maker’s knowledge, I (who have not practiced tool-making) can 
know that negative scarring is a feature of cores just as an experienced flintknapper can. 
However, our account of that knowledge differs: I can point to papers and observations and 
speak to the trustworthiness of those sources. A flintknapper reports that they have in fact 
struck a core to create a flake, thus bringing about the negative scarring. The flintknapper has 
been part of a negative-scar-producing-system.  
There are at least two worries we might have about Floridi’s account. First, maker’s 
knowledge is intimately connected with tacit know-how; which is awkward for an information-
theoretic account. That is, Floridi’s approach is restricted to propositional knowledge (say, of the 
form ‘that p’), but we might think maker’s knowledge can also be non-propositional, knowing 
how to construct a lithic for instance (e.g., Fantl 2008). If non-propositional know-how is a 
distinct kind of knowing, then Floridi’s account is critically restricted. Second, the account relies 
on an in-principle distinction between the maker’s observational knowledge that they successfully 
brought about p and the maker’s knowledge that p occurred. These are intimately linked in 
practice: surely my knowledge that I successfully brought about p (which is typically 
observational) grounds my maker’s knowledge of p’s occurrence. If in most circumstances 
maker’s knowledge requires observational knowledge, we might question its importance. 
Happily, for our purposes both worries can be discharged. 
 




Floridi’s account leads us to ask not whether there is a fundamental difference in the kind of 
knowledge makers and observers have, but after their differing accounts of knowledge. This 
avoids vexed questions about the relationship between know-how, know-that, and other kinds 
of knowledge which worried us earlier (e.g., Lewis 1988, Roland 1958). We needn’t ask if in 
principle the maker and the observer can possess the same knowledge. Instead, we ask whether 
making something ‘positions’ an agent to learn p more efficiently. 
I’ll understand positioning as a relationship between some knowledge, an agent, and a set of 
epistemological processes. An epistemological process well-positions an agent towards some 
knowledge just in case engaging in that process makes it more likely that the agent will learn that 
knowledge, compared to alternative processes. I might learn that negative scarring signals a core 
by reading about it, or by flintknapping. Whether testimony or making better positions depends 
on features of the agent, the type of knowledge at hand and the relevant comparisons. We can 
ask questions about positioning regardless of whether we think all knowledge is ultimately 
propositional or whatever. Further, we needn’t follow Floridi’s focus on propositional knowledge 
when considering positioning. I might be well-positioned to learn some skill, gain some 
phenomenal knowledge, and so forth. Thus ‘knowledge’ in positioning need not be 
propositional. 
Positioning deflates the second objection to Floridi. This relied on a close connection 
between an agent’s maker’s knowledge and their a-posteriori knowledge of having successfully 
made something. When considering how epistemic processes position agents, we naturally 
combine maker’s and observational knowledge, because we focus on processes of knowledge 
attainment. Reading a paper utilizes background knowledge about subject matter and the ins-
and-outs of paper reading; making a lithic tool utilizes embodied knowledge about tool-making, 
checking the made product against previous examples, etc... Abstract distinctions between 
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testimonial, observational, and maker’s knowledge are readily combined when considering how 
epistemic processes position an agent. 
So, what knowledge do activities like flintknapping well-position us for? A plausible answer is: 
embodied knowledge of construction processes. So, let’s consider embodied knowledge. 
3.2 Skill & Embodied Knowledge 
Discussion of embodied knowledge often begins by distinguishing between two kinds of 
memory: episodic and procedural. The former concerns recollecting particular events; the latter is 
a form of know-how involved in performing actions. The flintknapper might episodically recall a 
disastrous flaking attempt, the vivid disappointment of an apparently promising core cracking 
under a mistimed strike. Procedurally, processes of expert flintknapping draw on practiced skills 
and embodied actions built over years of practice. There is a rich literature across philosophy and 
psychology on the nature and relationship between episodic and procedural memory. This work 
often challenges representationalism or cognitivism about the mind, typically by demonstrating 
how our bodily environments shape mental content (e.g, Wilson & Foglia 2017). We needn’t dip 
deeply into those waters. Jonno Sutton’s discussion of expert cricket batting focuses on the 
processes underwriting expert skill performance, making an excellent jumping-off point for us 
(Sutton 2007, Richardson & Chemero 2014). 
Sutton challenges the cliché that the performance of expert skill requires, as it were, not 
thinking about what you’re doing; cutting oneself off from explicit episodic memory. 
[on such views] Having such batting skills and embodied memories, and being able to 
employ them, is utterly different from knowing about them, or being able to describe 
them, or even remembering your earlier exercise of them: practitioners differ profoundly 
from coaches, critics and commentators (2007, 767-768). 
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Against this strict split between on-line conscious episodic memory and off-line tacit 
embodied skill, Sutton emphasizes their interaction: 
… on the intelligence of the body and the diverse forms of interaction and mutual 
influence –cooperative as well as competitive, harmonious as well as disruptive – 
between thinking and doing: accepting that habits and skills are genuinely independent 
of conscious thought should not blind us to the ways in which genuine expertise allows, 
and sometimes requires, their sculpting and shaping. (2007, 722) 
For Sutton, expert skill is fundamentally reactive, involving careful adjustments, thus 
requiring feedback from explicit, online and episodic cognition: “experts require their embodied 
routines to be continually responsive to those varying conditions, and thus must have learned to 
influence themselves. Intelligent action must be flexible...” (774). Experts monitor how 
performance proceeds, anticipating possible hiccups and required adjustments, both being ‘lost 
in the process’ and aware of the space of possible outcomes. 
Like cricket batting, flintknapping is a complex, dynamical skill requiring the integration of 
bodily-learnt habits and a probing awareness of the task’s unfolding. It is “a form of regulated 
improvisation” as well as “a dynamic interceptive action” (2007, 764). The skilled knapper aims 
for a well-made tool via well-performed strikes whilst improvising around the contingencies of 
the core itself and the effects of previous scrapes. Although maker’s knowledge often 
emphasizes literally building things, note that by Floridi’s account (and my development of it) 
performance can generate maker’s knowledge as well. Both in making a lithic tool and 




So, in the context of experimental archaeological practices like flintknapping we can 
understand maker’s knowledge as the possession of dynamic embodied skill which integrates 
both habitual tacit know-how and various reactive monitoring intentional processes. 
4. Redux: Xeroxing and Integrative Interpretation 
In section 2, I highlighted two challenges. First, Xeroxing: the reconstruction of previous 
reconstructions, rather than reconstructions of particular sites. Second, archaeological analysis 
decontextualizes objects from their deposition and other objects in the site: they’re considered in 
isolation; yet, archaeological analysis is integrative. In section 3, I gave an account of 
experimental archaeology in terms of ‘maker’s knowledge’: building lithics well-positions 
practitioners to generate intimate embodied knowledge of construction processes and so forth.  
In this section, I’ll bring these together, showing how understanding experimental archaeology in 
terms of maker’s knowledge partially mitigates Xeroxing and sheds light on integration. In brief, 
experimental archaeology well-positions archaeologists for embodied knowledge of processes of 
construction. In the context of an experimental tradition, this enables grasping and challenging 
various archaeological explanations, an epistemic benefit beyond hypothesis-testing. Further, 
embodied knowledge is a crucial tool for re-integrating previously decontextualized information.  
4.1 Experimental Traditions in Archaeology 
Bell’s worries about xeroxing center on hypothesis-testing. We want to keep background 
theory independent of particular hypotheses; as such, reconstructing a previous 
reconstruction—partaking in an experimental tradition—builds the tradition’s preconceptions 
into hypotheses. But science is not about hypothesis-testing alone. Scientists require working 
knowledge and understanding of the hypotheses and theories they work with8. This is 
 
8 For recent philosophical work emphasizing understanding in science see Potochnik 2017, De Regt 
2017, De Regt, Leonelli & Eigner 2009. 
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emphasized for experimental archaeology in pedagogical and public-facing contexts (Clarkson & 
Shipton 2015, Torres & Márquez-Grant 2011) but I think it plays an important role for practicing 
scientists as well. The development of embodied knowledge of how to construct lithics, 
roundhouses, and so forth, well-positions archaeologists to understand the claims of previous 
traditions, and to challenge them.  
Consider the simple lithic knowledge from earlier: negative scarring signals core-like 
properties in a worked rock. You could grasp this by testimony and observation, or by building 
lithics yourself. As we’ve seen, developing expertise involves integrating embodied tacit 
processes with monitoring and forward-planning as tasks unfold. Making negative scars through 
flintknapping is a direct way of seeing why negative scarring, and particular fine-grained 
properties of scarring, signals not only core-like properties, but a sense of the expertise of the 
knapper, why the piece was worked as it was, and so forth.  
Such deep knowledge of flintknapping (or roundhouse-constructing, etc…) brings three 
benefits. First, the archaeologist doesn’t simply know that negative scarring signals a rock being 
core, but why. That is, their understanding of flint-knapping processes clarifies why certain kinds 
of rock morphology are traces of toolmaking. This matters for understanding, say, Kuhn’s foci on 
particular morphological characteristics in his reduction index. Logic obscure to me might be 
obvious to the flintknapper. Embodied knowledge well-positions archaeologists to grasp work 
like Kuhn’s.  
Second, embodied knowledge can underwrite analyses of various assemblages by using the 
experimental tradition to ground judgements of quality, difficulty or skill: 
Knappers can give us some idea about the difficulties involved in attaining various out-
comes and also estimates of the seriousness of various errors for the knapping sequence. 
20 
 
Following this reasoning, the number and severity of knapping errors should reflect skill 
in knapping performance. (Olausson 2017, 129). 
Third, maker’s knowledge matters for identifying how other sites buck trends and 
assumptions embedded within experimental traditions. For example, there are two approaches 
to categorizing lithics, one focusing on function, the other on processes of construction. Peter 
Hiscock calls the former ‘typology’ and the latter ‘material’ (Hiscock & Attenbrow 2003, Hiscock 
2007a, also called ‘morphological’ versus ‘technological’). He objects to typologies on various 
empirical and theoretical grounds, but the critical difference for us is in how understanding 
processes of reduction reveals variation across tools in terms of differences in construction 
processes; a discrete functional typology is transformed into a gradual picture of change.  
…in materialist classifications repeated artifact forms are explained by reference to 
activities that impinge on knapping and artifact use. Hence while typological 
classifications typically cite factors involving design criteria to explain the form and 
abundance of retouch, materialist discussions might cite mechanisms such as the 
rejuvenation of a dysfunctional edge, raw material properties, raw material availability, 
and the form of hafting. (Hiscock 2007a, 202). 
Materialists examine “the form of an artifact in terms of the mechanisms by which it was 
created” (202). Here, maker’s knowledge of the construction of artifacts leads archaeologists 
away from typological classification to ‘material’ classification. Archaeologists in both traditions 
build lithics, but folks like Hiscock and Kuhn were not merely Xeroxing previous efforts. 
This partially mitigates Xeroxing. Insofar as we are in the business of hypothesis-testing, 
following an experimental tradition can lead to circularity, obscuring the contingencies of 
different sites and traditions. Even if Xeroxing positions oneself to understand archaeological 
processes, one must go beyond it both to understand particular sites and get a broader sense of 
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the diversity of cultural, technological and economic practices that archaeologists are interested 
in. Regardless, once we consider aspects of knowledge-production beyond testing hypotheses, 
we see that the embodied skill experimental archaeology positions us for enables fruitful 
understanding of, and engagement with, experimental traditions in archaeology. 
4.2 Danish Daggers & Integrated Interpretation 
Archaeologists are not primarily interested in measuring and categorizing the archaeological 
record: they aim to understand the lifeways and material, economic and social practices of past 
humans. This is why they develop integrative interpretations of particular sites and societies, and 
why the decontextualization of material extraction, categorization and analysis presents a 
challenge. Maker’s knowledge well-positions archaeologists for re-contextualizing. To see this, 
let’s delve into a case study. 
A vexing phenomenon in the Neolithic record is the sheer quantity of tools: there are too 
many, and of too high quality, for utility to explain. Archaeologists have appealed to pedagogical 
or economic factors, or hypothesized that fancy lithics might be prestige or ritual items, or that 
they mark differences between casual, beginner knappers and craft specialists. Considering the 
phenomenon in the Northern European late-Neolithic, Deborah Olausson argues that the 
prevalence of flint daggers of high technical competence signal the presence of skilled (but not 
necessarily professional) artisans “who wished to challenge their own embodied flintknapping 
skills” (2017, 127). In doing so, Olausson moves beyond understanding how particular 
flintknapping processes work in isolation, to consider them in an integrative context: how do flint 
daggers fit into the complex social worlds of their makers?  
Traditionally archaeologists built relationships with skilled knappers and made inferences 
based on their expertise and reports. Subsequent hypotheses often reflected those knappers’ 
circumstances: projecting into the past their high-prestige master/apprentice style hierarchies. 
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Olausson’s work is part of an ongoing discussion challenging this (e.g., Apel 2009, Apel & 
Knutsson 2006). She suggests that part of the motivation behind prestige-based explanations is 
the difficulty modern knappers have in making the best examples: “contemporary knappers 
regard making a “Danish dagger” as an almost unreachable goal, shrouded in mystery” (133-134). 
But this is true only of the period’s best flint daggers: there is a wide variety of quality and 
apparent use. 
 
Figure 1: Late Neolithic Stone Daggers, from most skilled (left) to least (right) (Olausson 2017, 129, © Taylor & 
Francis) 
Traditionally, it is assumed that highly technical, potentially ornamental, objects require 
structured division of labor. Olausson challenges this via a quantified study of 511 flint daggers. 
She measures the skillfulness of a dagger’s construction in terms of four quantified properties: 
knapping errors, width-thickness ratio, symmetry and length. Such quantified measures are 
grounded in the experience of skilled modern knappers; the justification of the skill-measurement 
turns on the traditions knappers have developed over years of communal practice. From the 
quantified study, Olausson points to the wide variety of skill within the traditional categories of 
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flint daggers, noting there is “little variation in skill levels between types” (Olausson 2017, 131, 
emphasis hers): every style of dagger ranges between the highly skilled and the unskilled. 
Olausson then builds a picture of knapping pedagogy and social structure. She estimates 
production levels based in part on how long it takes modern knappers to complete skilled work 
(as high production may indicate economic demand). The quantity of daggers that could be 
produced by specialized, highly-skilled, fulltime knappers outruns estimates from the record. 
“…production volumes do not speak of mass production or dagger factories churning out large 
numbers of standardized products” (Olausson 2017, 133). 
Pointing to the common examples of daggers made across a wide range of skill, Olausson 
argues that “virtually any member of Late Neolithic society was able to make a dagger, although 
only a few could make the finest daggers” (133). She compares a community of expert, 
institutionally supported, full-time knappers making prestige items utilizing potentially secret, 
protected knowledge to techniques developed by a less structured group of passionate 
amateurs. For illustration, she compares Marc Pfeiffer, a hobbyist cabinet maker and Errett 
Callahan, who “In his prime… could be described as a full-time knapping specialist” (137). 
I suggest that Marc, striving for artistic excellence and driven by a personal sense of 
satisfaction but not making a living at his craft, might be a better model for the makers of 
the finest Late Neolithic daggers. As people sharing a lithic habitus, all members of Late 
Neolithic society were able to knap flint at some level of skill. The poor and mediocre 
daggers suggest that large numbers of individuals made daggers, although with varying 
degrees of success. A few individuals were particularly talented and interested, and when 
they had time on their hands they experimented with flint. (Ibid, 137) 
Regardless of whether we agree with Olausson, this is a remarkable feat of integration: we 
shift from understanding flint daggers as isolated, decontextualized objects, to things with 
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makers embedded in social, economic and institutional contexts. In Olausson’s analysis, 
embodied knowledge of flintknapping doesn’t simply generate lines of evidence, it—and the 
objects themselves, as I’ll argue—provided a crucial platform underwriting integration, grounded 
by maker’s knowledge of modern flintknappers: their judgements about skill, the time and work 
it takes them to gain expertise and construct individual daggers, and their varying motivations.  
Olausson’s analysis relied on knappers’ judgements about dagger quality. Her measurements 
are an approximation or distillation of that knowledge. Knapper’s know-how, their embodied 
understanding of dagger construction, was crucial for shifting from the daggers understood as 
isolated artifacts to objects integrated into social worlds. Because knappers themselves partake 
in similar embodied practices as ancient knappers (however different their social worlds) they 
provide a partial bridge to them. Archaeological integration requires imagining the material 
record as something used, built, and discarded by folks embedded in various traditions, cultures 
and practices, and—however obliquely—embodied knowledge is critical for such imagining.  
Further, specimens themselves matter for how archaeological integration: flintknapper’s 
embodied knowledge isn’t only of the processes that would produce flint daggers, but of flint 
daggers. In a biological context, Jim Griesemer has argued that focal organisms are sometimes 
crucial for integration. They provide a ‘platform’ for posing various questions and bringing 
together varied methods. 
Organisms… are themselves coherent systems of interacting, highly organized parts. 
They, in effect, package or bundle the problems that interest scientific researchers with 
others that they may not even be aware of until they are well engaged in a particular 
investigation. These problem packages afford opportunities as well as present challenges 
to researchers, who can barely solve one problem without creating interest in others 
because the coupling of parts and activities, processes and behaviors by organisms… 
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means that any observation or intervention to study one problem will have implications 
and consequences for phenomena concerning other problems. (Griesemer 2013, 529) 
Similarly to focal organisms in biology, both specimens of ancient flint daggers and their 
modern proxies act as material platforms for integration and research direction. Because 
archaeological investigation of lithic technology is rooted to material objects, and such objects 
are not transparent to researchers, they form a remarkably productive focus for reaching into 
social and cognitive pasts. In the context of the skilled embodied knowledge characteristic of 
experimental archaeology, the platform isn’t simply the lithic materials, but of such materials 
coupled with the physiological and cognitive systems of the practitioners (and indeed perhaps a 
distributed system of such, due to communal practice).  
No doubt, maker’s knowledge is not the be-all and end-all of integration, but I think it 
plausible that, it is often a crucial lynchpin. 
A skeptic might appeal to the explicit nature of scientific knowledge. Recall the apparent 
tension between knappers like Bordes’ appeal to tacit knowledge and recent conceptions of 
experimental archaeology as hypothesis-testing. One might say that because scientific 
knowledge is communal, intersubjective, then knowledge is explicit it is notpart of science per se. 
I’m not moved by such claims: processes of scientific pedagogy and continuity of practice ensure 
communication between scientists via shared embodied knowledge (Leonelli 2017). Science’s 
intersubjectivity is not threatened by tacit knowledge. But even if you’re tempted by that line of 
thought, my account has something to say about how the tacit becomes explicit. Let’s briefly 
return to Sutton’s discussion of embodied know-how and its relationship to propositional, 
episodic, knowledge. Speaking of the view that good skilled performance requires experts 
cutting themselves off from episodic memory he says, 
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… [this] suggests the primacy of embodied performance, and the secondary and 
derivative role of thought and talk about the game, as if acquisition of explicit knowledge 
about batting or explicit memory of batting, for example, is an incidental by-product of 
skilled performance rather than a contributing factor in the exercise of that skill. (772-773) 
Sutton argues that explicit episodic memory plays a larger role in expert skill, but I emphasize 
a different point. To the extent that explicit knowledge can be generated from embodied 
performance, maker’s knowledge well-positions us to build explicit propositional theories. Kuhn’s 
development of a reduction index was grounded in maker’s knowledge; Olausson’s analysis of 
skillfulness comes from the embodied know-how of modern flint-knappers; Hiscock’s appeal to 
‘materialist’ approaches to understanding lithics starts from learning how the tools were made. 
Even if we think scientific knowledge in only propositional (which we shouldn’t), we should 
nonetheless agree that maker’s knowledge well-positions us to get it. 
A final upshot: archaeological knowledge of lithic technology and the societies that produced 
them is not the purview of academic archaeologists alone, but also the specialists and 
craftspeople developing embodied expertise pertaining to that technology9. This feeds crucially 
into the speculative nature of experimental archaeology. 
5. Material Speculation 
I’ve provided an account of experimental archaeology which emphasizes the role of maker’s 
knowledge—embodied, complex skill—in grasping and challenging experimental traditions and 
building integrative interpretations. I want to close by using experimental archaeology as an 
example of material speculation. Speculation is the generation and exploration of ideas and 
 
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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hypotheses. Experimental archaeology doesn’t only involve hypothesis testing but hypothesis 
generation and, as such, can be considered a speculative activity. 
Philosophers of science have been surprisingly quiet when it comes to explicit discussion of 
speculation10. When it is discussed, speculation is understood roughly as a hypothesis which 
outruns available evidence, the justification of which lies in the fruitfulness of pursuing the 
hypothesis (Achinstein 2018, Swedberg 2018, Currie 2018 287-289, Turner 2019)11. Considering 
speculation’s legitimacy, we often see fairly coarse distinctions: speculation has no part of 
science qua science (a view mistakenly attributed to Newton12); speculation should be 
unconstrained (a view mistakenly attributed to Feyarabend13); speculation is justified 
pragmatically (Achinstein 2018). Speculation is critical to science and clearly good speculation is 
directed, intelligent: not just anything will do. No doubt, speculation’s justification is pragmatic, 
but more is beholden on us to say. 
Another feature of philosophical consideration of speculation is its theoretical nature. 
Speculation involves the generation of ideas: the exercise of imagination and the risky 
exploration of abstract search-spaces. Speculation, in effect, is understood as occurring in the 
scientist’s head. To illustrate, consider Peirce’s rich work on ‘guessing’ (apologies to Peirce-
scholars!). Peirce argues that guessing is critically important for science: roughly, generating 
ideas that may form the basis of testable hypotheses. His advice in this regard is often 
psychological, recommending that good guessers should be “in as passive and receptive a state” 
as possible (Peirce 1929, 285). Or consider Whewell’s ‘happy thoughts’ (sorry Whewell scholars!), 
which are later made explicit and prepared for empirical study (Whewell 1840/1996). Again, focus 
 
10 Although speculation matters a lot in, for instance, Feyarabend’s epistemic anarchy, Kuhn’s 
revolutionary science, etc…Speculation is not often explicitly discussed, but much attention has been paid 
to scientific discovery (Schickore 2018): I leave connections for later work. 
11 Popper’s notion of a ‘bold hypothesis’ does not fit this mold insofar as he is focused on deductive 
models of scientific reasoning, but is nonetheless similar in spirit. 
12 See Walsh 2019 
13 See Kidd 2011 
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is on the imaginative capacities of well-prepared minds. By contrast, speculation in experimental 
archaeology is sometimes embodied: the archaeologist speculates by learning and performing a 
complex expert skill, and their exploration is constrained and directed by their materials. 
Here, speculation is ‘material’ in two senses. First, we understand the justification of 
speculation by analogy with Norton’s ‘material theory of induction’. Norton argues that induction 
is not justified by abstract schema but by the local, material, conditions (2003, ms). Norton notes 
that various approaches to understanding evidence, such as qualitative analyses of evidential 
support, quantitative (Bayesian for instance) approaches, etc…, appear to work better in some 
cases than others. The explanation, he claims, is that facts about local conditions differently 
enable those accounts to gain traction: 
…the application of the various approaches work when we add factual conditions 
that limit the domain in which they are to be applied. The stronger the factual 
restriction, the more successful the application. The material approach simply 
asks us to “take the limit.” That is, what warrants the successful application of 
the particular inference is found entirely in the background factual conditions that 
delimit the domain of application. (Norton ms, 4, as of April 2020). 
As for induction, so for speculation; justification is grounded in the particular material 
affordances scientists face. For comparison, let’s use Popper as a foil (Popper 1959/2002). Popper 
argues that scientists should aim for maximally ‘bold’ hypotheses: that is, hypotheses which are 
(1) maximally falsifiable, and (2) conflict with our current knowledge. The falsifiability of a 
hypothesis is an intensional notion: a hypothesis is more falsifiable to the extent that there are 
possible observations that would falsify it. To determine the boldness of a hypothesis, then, we 
needn’t know anything much about context beyond current going theories. Now consider 
flintknapping: what makes the practice of contemporary archaeologists and hobbyists spending 
hours figuring out how to make archaic tools so extraordinarily fruitful and productive? That is, 
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what makes it a good speculative practice? To answer this question (I claim) we must point to the 
material situation archaeologists are in.  
Faced with a fragmentary lithic record, and despite enormous disparity in social life, 
modern archaeologists and ancient flintknappers share relevantly similar materials and 
physiologies. Archaeologists explore the capacities of flints and other materials, discovering how 
to make similar tools, learning along the way the capacities of various materials and techniques 
and their own limitations and potential abilities. This enables archaeologists to generate diverse 
hypotheses and embodied knowledge which, as we’ve seen, form the basis of rich, well-founded 
interpretations. It is the material facts that underwrite the speculation’s success, not abstract 
properties such as a hypothesis’ falsifiability. The hypotheses generated are built from and are 
embedded within background knowledge: they are not better because they dramatically conflict 
with existing knowledge as Popper would have it, although they may sometimes do so.  
An anonymous referee insightfully notes that I’ve largely focused on what we might call 
the overgeneration of hypotheses: given the wide range of possible hypotheses, how do we 
productively narrow our search? But the inverse—the undergeneration of hypotheses—is also 
worthy of concern. Given the temporal distance between archaeologists and past practices, and 
our species’ characteristic plasticity, heterogeneity and creativity, what reason is there to think 
that the hypotheses we generate on the basis of our current understanding are actually relevant 
to the cultural past? Successfully constructing a Danish dagger establishes a capacity for such a 
thing to be built in that manner, but it doesn’t establish that it was built the same way in the 
past14. More pertinently, how do we know that our search space is wide enough to not miss 
relevant hypotheses?15 Here, too the materiality of experimental archaeology provides part of the 
 
14 Although it is likely that the constraints on building such items are so strict that it is unlikely they 
could be built in another manner… 
15 In an archaeological context, discussion of this point has often focused on the pitfalls of 
ethnographic analogy in constraining hypotheses about the past. Given the diversity of human lifeways, 
why think that the current (or at least very recent) ethnographic record captures the range of possibilities? 
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answer. The material continuity between past bodies, cognition, capacities and objects and those 
employed in experimental archaeology grounds the latter’s relevance for the former. Our species 
is diverse, but not that diverse. Further, the integrative and exploratory approach of archaeology 
can often identify where discontinuities might matter, as we saw in Olausson’s arguments 
against projecting the specialized, hierarchical apprentice model of modern knappers into the 
past. At base, I think, concern for the undergeneration of hypotheses should lead us towards 
more diverse experimental practices in archaeology16, and to what extent archaeologists 
successfully navigate both the under- and overgeneration of hypotheses remains an open 
question. 
Regardless, the justification of the speculative side of experimental archaeology is 
material. 
The second sense of ‘material’ is literal: instead of a theoretical, purely imaginative 
activity, experimental archaeology is speculation as a material practice: an embodied, practical 
activity17. Let’s briefly consider a fairly wide-spread approach to the generation of ideas. In 
studies of creativity it is common to imagine problem-solvers exploring a search-space of possible 
solutions18. Given features of the search-space, and the capacities of agents, how ought problem 
solvers explore? Are there systematic, methodical approaches that increase the efficiency of 
discovering good solutions? One tactic narrows the search space’s perimeters: if we’ve reason to 
think good solutions lie in a particular area, then to an extent our search should focus on those 
locations.  
 
(see Freeman 1968, Gould 1980, Hiscock 2007b for versions of this worry and see Wylie 1985, 1988, Currie 
2016 and Nyrup 2020 for replies).  
16 For instance, the referee points to Tuominen (2020)’s study of the relationship between dance and 
archaeological practice. Given that the search-space of archaeological speculation is generated by the 
materials and those interacting with them, varied kinds of interactors are likely to generate quite different, 
and potentially highly productive, search-spaces. 
17 There’s been recent work on the scientific imagination, although it is more interested in analysis and 
modeling than explicitly its role in speculation, see, for instance Levy & Godfrey-Smith (2019). 
18 See, for instance, Gopnik et al 2017, Boden 2004, Currie 2019b. 
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Following this abstract treatment, a fundamental way that archaeologists narrow their 
search-space is via the material conditions exhibited by experiment. The search space is set by 
the materials—rocks—as well as the physiology and learning capacities of the knapper. These 
materials shape how the knapper explores the possibility of what can be achieved, and thus the 
hypotheses which are explored and generated. The knappers are exploring a space of material 
capacities. They do not simply learn by trial and error, but draw and build upon years of habit and 
skillful improvisation. These material capacities are intimately connected with questions about 
the archaeological record and are a rich source for developing testable hypotheses. Indeed, the 
material affordances of a knapper differ from those relying on testimony; they thus likely well-
position us for learning different kinds of knowledge. 
Consider once more the difficulty of constructing a ‘Danish dagger’. In figuring out how 
to construct such a dagger, identifying both the required skills, sequences and materials, modern 
flintknappers map out a problem space. This problem space is not set by abstract criteria, but by 
material circumstance. These circumstances position knappers to explore the capacities of their 
materials, as well as their own physiology and potential expertise, towards figuring out how to 
make a Danish dagger. This is as much a speculative activity as, say, the imaginative generation of 
a ‘happy thought’. But that activity is fundamentally embodied and grounded in maker’s 
knowledge.  
Bringing both senses of materiality together, the material conditions of experimental 
archaeology afford archaeologists the capacity to explore relevant search-spaces, thus 
productive idea-generation; therein lies its justification. Speculation is here embodied; not purely 
imaginative nor abstract. Speculation is justified materially; not on the basis of some logic of 
discovery. 
Just as appealing to factors beyond hypothesis-testing doesn’t deny the importance of 
testing hypotheses, appeal to speculation’s materiality doesn’t entail that abstract imaginings are 
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unimportant. But it does lead to considering speculation in material terms: instead of asking 
about how ideas are generated in the disembodied scientific mind, we ask how the various 
affordances of scientists embedded in rich material and social environments lead them to explore 
particular capacities. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I’ve provided a philosophical account of experimental archaeology, at least as it 
pertains to lithic technologies. In section 2 I analyzed the hypothesis-testing side of experimental 
archaeology, particularly as a kind of ‘trace-based reasoning’ which aims to understand processes 
linking the material record to the past. I argued that so understood the materiality of 
experimental archaeology can act as a bridge between theory and practice, and then set out two 
further worries: xeroxing and integration. In section 3 I provided an account of ‘maker’s 
knowledge’ based on how bringing something about might ‘well-position’ an agent to gain some 
knowledge. I then argued that experimental archaeology can be understood as well-positioning 
agents to gain skilled, embodied knowledge of production practices (of lithics, for example). 
These points were drawn on in section 4 to argue that, understood thusly, experimental 
archaeology mitigates and explains the role of Xeroxing in experimental traditions and how 
archaeologists construct integrative interpretations. Finally, in section 5 I argued that 
experimental archaeology is an example of material speculation, that is, its justification is 
grounded in material circumstance, and the speculative search-space is set by the physical 
system. 
I hope to have provided fodder for those with both archaeological and philosophical 
leanings. For archaeologists, I’ve emphasized that some practices within experimental 
archaeology are fruitfully understood in ways beyond hypothesis-testing. Experimental practices 
such as flintknapping generate embodied maker’s knowledge which provision diverse epistemic 
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benefits. Experimental archaeology is a speculative strategy where the physicality of the 
materials and experimenters produce fruitful exploration of the capacities required to make 
sense of past human activities. For philosophers, I’ve provided a way of understanding maker’s 
knowledge in terms of positioning, thus side-stepping discussions of the fundamental 
relationship between propositional knowledge and know-how. I’ve shown how maker’s 
knowledge thus understood is revelatory of the justification and nature of speculative strategies 
in science.  
My discussion has been importantly restricted in at least two ways. First, I haven’t provided 
anything like a systematic survey of experimental archaeology. Whether my characterization 
applies more widely is an open question. Second and similarly, the extent to which my emphasis 
on speculation’s materiality in lithic flintknapping is revelatory of speculation in general is also an 
open question. These are features not bugs: my account succeeds to the extent that it can act as 
a model for comparisons or contrasts across archaeological (and other scientific) practices. It 
may be that sometimes speculation’s materiality is critical for understanding its epistemic 
properties, while playing a less important role in other contexts. Regardless, the embodied 
practices of some experimental archaeologists are a powerful example of how scientists engage 
with the materiality of their subjects in remarkably creative, productive ways. 
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